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I. INTRODUCTION

It has long been claimed that international lawmaking has
grown pluralized in the sense that it has allegedly moved away from
the traditional Westphalian and state-centric model of lawmaking.'
New processes outside traditional diplomatic channels and involving
non-state actors are said to qualify as lawmaking, and the products
thereof have come to be ascertainable as genuine legal rules. 2 Such
an assertion of a pluralization of international lawmaking is now
common, and those studies that fail to give it sufficient emphasis are
demoted to antediluvian scholarship. 3
This uncontested prejudice in favor of pluralistic representations
of lawmaking processes 4 calls for a preliminary remark that will
inform the argument subsequently made in this Part. Although
uncontested in mainstream international legal scholarship,5 the mere
finding that international lawmaking is now more heterogeneous,
accommodates new forms of law-generating processes, and gives a say
to new types of actors presupposes that international lawmaking was,
in the past, monolithic and state-centric. In that sense, the claim of
the pluralization of international law rests on a strong prejudice

See generally Peter M. R. Stirk, The Westphalian Model and Sovereign
1.
Equality, 38 REV. INT'L STUD. 641, 641-60 (2012) (discussing the Westphalian model
and the seemingly recent trend away from this lawmaking process). For some critical
remarks, see Stiphane Beaulac, The Westphalian Legal Orthodoxy - Myth or Reality?,
2 J. HIST. INT'L L. 148, 148-77 (2000).
2.
For a few examples, see Jutta Brunn6e & Stephen J. Toope, International
Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of InternationalLaw, 39
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19 (2000-2001).
See ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
3.
LAW, 97 (Malcolm Evans & Phoebe Okowa eds., 2007) ("Focus on the continued
exclusion of NGOs from formal aspects of international lawmaking misses the political
and social reality of their increased participation on state and IGO behavior-whether
this is deemed favourable or otherwise.").
See infra Part II (providing a brief overview of the state of the literature in
4.
this respect). For critical remarks, see Jean d'Aspremont, The Doctrinal Illusion of the
Heterogeneity of InternationalLawmaking Processes, in 2 SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE
EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 297, 297-312 (H6lne Ruiz Fabri, Riidiger
available at
2010),
Publishing
Hart
Gogolin eds.,
& Jana
Wolfrum
http://paper.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1230964 (demonstrating that "the
contemporary assertion that international lawmaking has become more heterogeneous
is less the result of an actual practice than the outcome of an inclination of scholars to
expand their material of study").
See d'Aspremont, The Doctrinal Illusion of the Heterogeneity of
5.
International Lawmaking Processes, supra note 4, at 297-312 (recognizing the
assertion that international lawmaking has become more
contemporary
heterogeneous).
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about the state of the prepluralized era of lawmaking.6 In that sense,
the empirical finding of a pluralization of international lawmaking,
albeit being almost unanimously shared among observers and
scholars, manifests consensus on some preconceived data that is the
preexistence of something like the Westphalian order. Needless to say
that such preconceived data is itself the expression of a construction.7
This being said, it is not the aim of these introductory
considerations to shed a radical, skeptical veil on all attempts to
make sense of international lawmaking. While acknowledging the
prejudices informing the conceptualizations of lawmaking in the
literature, the foregoing only means to recall the uncontroversial
relativity of any basic empirical or conceptual finding about law.
Indeed, one cannot seriously engage with the theories of lawmakingas this Article is supposed to do-without bringing to mind such an
elementary observation. Currently, it seems beyond dispute that the
way in which lawyers construct not only law but also fact-practices
of creation or application of rules-is contingent on the cognitive lens
with which one has-consciously or unconsciously-chosen to look at
international law. 8
If one applies the abovementioned elementary epistemological
remarks to the question of international lawmaking under discussion
here, the story would go as follows. When one wants-as most
international legal scholars do-to make sense of and systematize the
international lawmaking process, one needs to choose a paradigm
through which to cognize norm-generating processes in international
law and the contours of the international legal order that these normgenerating processes create. A few dominant paradigms seem to have
emerged in the literature about lawmaking processes. They ought to
be briefly sketched out at this introductory stage before they are
further examined in the paragraphs that follow.
When it comes to cognizing international lawmaking, one of the
most dominant paradigms found in the literature has been the
"subjecthood" paradigm. Indeed, subjecthood has been used to cognize
all the practices of international norm-generating processes in
international law. Processes that could not be captured by virtue of

6.
See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and
International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 185 (1997) (outlining briefly the
state of the prepluralized era of lawmaking).
7.

See

generally

ALASDAIR

MACINTYRE,

WHOSE

JUSTICE?

WHICH

RATIONALITY? 333 (Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd. 1988) ("There are no preconceptual or
even pretheoretical data. . . .").
8.
The relativity of the cognitive tool is one of the paradigms of the inquiry
carried out in Jean d'Aspremont, Non-state Actors from the Perspective of Legal
Positivism, in PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE
PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (Jean d'Aspremont
ed., 2011).
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the concept of subjecthood would not qualify as international
lawmaking.9 Subjecthood is a static model for the apprehension of
international lawmaking processes. International legal scholarship on
lawmaking has also given rise to another static conceptualization of
lawmaking, one grounded in the "pedigree" of the norm produced.
According to this paradigm, lawmaking would be any process that
leads to the creation of a norm that can be ascertained as a legal rule
by virtue of its pedigree.10 Such a form of staticism has proven more
formal than the traditional approach, which is based on statehood, as
the former has entailed a resort to a theory of formal sources."1
The paradigm of subjecthood and that of formal pedigree came
under the fire of the "New Haven School," whose disciples contended
that either subjecthood or pedigree must be abandoned because their
inherent staticism was said not to allow one to comprehend
international lawmaking processes.12 International norm-generating
processes should not be cognized on the basis of a static and arbitrary
concept like subjecthood. Rather, a more dynamic cognitive tool, like
that of participation, offers better cognitive tools to comprehend (the
dynamics of) international lawmaking processes and their actors.13
This old schism between staticism-associated with subjecthood-and
continued
with
participation-has
dynamism-associated
uninterrupted for the last several decades, fueling immense
controversy and generating reams of repetitive scholarship.14
Against the backdrop of a seemingly irreconcilable tension
between staticism and dynamism in scholarly models of international
lawmaking as well as the cognitive limitations of approaches
exclusively based on participation, scholars have endeavored to
develop other perspectives on international lawmaking. In particular,
and as will be discussed below, new conceptualizations have
attempted to understand lawmaking from the standpoint of the
impact of its input. 15 This is the cognitive twist found in approaches
informed by "global administrative law" (GAL) or the Heidelberg
project's research on international institutions exercising public
authority. Others, coming to terms with the abiding divide between
the abovementioned static and dynamic approaches, have attempted
to overcome the debate between subjecthood, pedigree, and

9.
For an overview of such an approach, see infra Part III.A.
10.
For an overview of such an approach, see infra Part III.B.
11.
For an outline of the emergence and evolution of that paradigm in
international legal scholarship, see JEAN D'ASPREMONT, FORMALISM AND THE SOURCES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A THEORY OF THE ASCERTAINMENT OF LEGAL RULES 38-82
(2011).
12.
For criticisms of static approaches, see infra Part III.C.
13.
For an overview of such an approach, see infra Part III.C.
See infra Part III.C.
14.
15.
For an overview of such approaches, see infra Part III.D.
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participation by advocating a neostatic and neoformalistic pedigreebased approach to lawmaking. The main difference with the classic
static approach originates in the pedigree being itself in constant
evolution and flux and constantly allowing new norm-generating
processes to be elevated to lawmaking status.
As demonstrated by this introductory overview, the international
legal scholarship, in its quest for a paradigm able to apprehend
international norm-generating processes qualifying as lawmaking,
has been oscillating between static approaches and dynamic
approaches. The former are based on the author of the norm
(subjecthood) or its formal origin (pedigree) whilst the latter (e.g.,
participation) try to capture and explain the intricate and
multidimensional fluxes between the authors of the norms and the
norms themselves (impact or dynamic pedigree). International legal
scholars have thus been resorting to various and diverging paradigms
to make sense of international lawmaking. All of these approaches
will be described in further detail below.
This Article endeavors to shed some light on the reasons guiding
scholars to choose one of these paradigms. After a brief outline of the
mainstream empirical construction of current norm-generating
processes in international law and a further detailed description of
the main cognitive choices found in international legal scholarship,
this Article elaborates on the driving forces behind each of the main
paradigms permeating contemporary literature on international
lawmaking. In doing so, this Article draws attention to the politics of
empiricism and cognition with the aim of engaging in critical selfreflection on how international legal scholars and practitioners have
been making sense of international lawmaking.

II. EMPIRICAL CONCORD: THE PLURALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAWMAKING

This Part recalls the main traits of the contemporary
pluralization of international lawmaking as it is empirically depicted
in mainstream scholarship. While there seems to be a consensus on
the principal characteristics of the move away from the Westphalian,
state-centric lawmaking blueprint (Part II.A), some disagreement
persists regarding the extent of the resilience of states as the
principal legal actors (Part II.B). All in all, however, the phenomenon
of pluralization has not been disputed. As the subsequent Part will
demonstrate, the major source of disagreement among experts has
not been their empirical model to understand the practice but rather
the analytical tool that they have used to reconstruct that practice
and its significance for international law as a whole.
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A. Manifestationsof Pluralizationin the Practiceof
InternationalLawmaking
The mainstream view is that, in practice, the making of modern
international law has witnessed a growing pluralization ratione
personae for actors other than states have gradually increased their
role in lawmaking processes.16 As the story goes, states have ceased
to be perceived as having a monopoly on international lawmaking. It
is true that this has not been a completely unprecedented
phenomenon.1 7 Yet, this pluralization ratione personae of
international lawmaking has become of a unique intensity.' 8 As a
result, the idea is now commonly accepted that a myriad of actors are
involved nowadays in lawmaking processes, although this does not
prejudge the question of who formally holds the rights and obligations
created thereby.' 9 Consequently, normative authority is no longer
understood as being exercised by a closed circle of high-ranking
officials acting on behalf of states. It is agreed that normative
authority, instead, boils down to a tangle of complex procedures
involving various state and non-state actors.20 According to that
common view, public authority is construed as having grown informal
and estranged from the traditional international lawmaking
processes. 21

16.
See Charnovitz, supra note 6, at 184 (noting the expansion of pluralization);
see also BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 3, at 42-43 (outlining how pluralization has
grown throughout various points in history).
17.
See Charnovitz, supra note 6, at 184-85 (explaining that while many
believe the increasing involvement of NGOs within the international community to be
a "twentieth-century phenomenon," the growth has actually been "occur[ing] for over
200 years"); see also BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 3, at 42-43 (outlining how
pluralization has grown throughout various points in history); Jean d'Aspremont, NonState Actors in International Law: Oscillating Between Concepts and Dynamics, in
PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON
NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 4 (Jean d'Aspremont ed., 2011).

18.
See BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 3, at 43 (highlighting the "exponential
growth" of non-state actors participating within the international community);
d'Aspremont, Non-State Actors in InternationalLaw: OscillatingBetween Concepts and
Dynamics, supranote 17, at 4.
19.
See BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 3, at 97 ("It would be myopic to insist on
the classical view of states as the sole makers of international law; rather we must
recognize the multi-layered, multi-partite nature of the international law-making
enterprise.") (internal citations omitted); d'Aspremont, Non-State Actors in
InternationalLaw: OscillatingBetween Concepts and Dynamics, supranote 17, at 5.
20.
This has sometimes been called 'verticalization'. See JAN KLABBERS, ANNE
PETERS & GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 14

(2009); d'Aspremont, Non-State Actors in International Law: Oscillating Between
Concepts and Dynamics, supra note 17, at 5.
21.
See Matthias Goldmann, Inside Relative Normativity: From Sources to
Standard Instruments for the Exercise of InternationalPublicAuthority, 9 GERMAN L.J.
1865, 1871-79 (2008) (identifying alternative ways in which public authority is
exercised at the international level); see also Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann &
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Compelling empirical evidence is usually produced to underpin
these conclusions. 22 On the basis thereof, non-state actors can be said
to have been expanding their clout in international lawmaking
processes while also exerting some influence in the review 23 and
amendment2 4 procedures of international treaties. It is nonetheless
acknowledged in the literature that, although the degree of their
influence is probably unprecedented, the involvement of non-state
actors is not entirely unheard of. Indeed, in a famous article, Steve
Charnovitz demonstrated that nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) have been contributing to international lawmaking processes
for more than two hundred years. 25 Despite concurring with this
finding, most scholars agree that the degree and intensity of their
contribution to lawmaking has increased dramatically. 26
Besides the abovementioned pluralization ratione personae of
lawmaking at the international level, other types of pluralization are
mentioned in the literature. For instance, processes by virtue of
which international law is made are said to have turned
heterogeneous as regards to the nature and format of the instruments
through which norms are produced at the international level. This
diversification has been construed as the manifestation of a healthy

Matthias Goldmann, Developing the Publicnessof Public InternationalLaw: Towards a
Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1375, 1387-88
(2008) (discussing external approaches to international law and differences from classic
international law).
22.
See generally BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 3 (providing a significant
amount of empirical materials throughout their study).
23.
See Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personal Mines and on Their Destruction art. 12, Sept. 18, 1997, 36
I.L.M. 1507 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Convention on the
Prohibition], available at http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocslban-trty.htm (noting
that NGOs may participate in review procedures); Convention on Cluster Munitions
art. 12, opened for signature Dec. 3, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 357 (entered into force Aug. 1,
2010), available at http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/01/Convention-ENG.pdf
("[R]elevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review
Conference...."); d'Aspremont, The Doctrinal Illusion of the Heterogeneity of
InternationalLawmaking Processes, supranote 4, at 297-312.
24.
See Convention on the Prohibition, supra note 23, at art. 13 ("[R]elevant
non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment
Conference. . . ."); d'Aspremont, The Doctrinal Illusion of the Heterogeneity of
InternationalLawmaking Processes, supra note 4, at 297-312.
25.
Charnovitz, supra note 6, at 185; d'Aspremont, The DoctrinalIllusion of the
Heterogeneity of InternationalLawmaking Processes,supra note 4, at 297-312.
26.
See generally Galle Breton-Le Goff, NGO's Perspectives on Non-State
Actors, in PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 248 (Jean d'Aspremont
ed., Routledge 2011) (recognizing that while "NGOs are not a new phenomenon,"
recently they have been "gain[ing] in visibility and attract[ing] the attention of legal
scholars"); NGOS, THE UN, & GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (T. G. Weiss & L. Gordenker eds.,
1996).
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pluralism or, sometimes, that of a daunting fragmentation.2 7 The
present Article does not fully develop these contentions. It only
argues that there seems to have been an overall consensus on their
empirical existence.
B. PersistingState Dominance?
While there seems to have been a consensus among authors and
experts about the empirical manifestations of the pluralization of
international lawmaking, some of them have argued that the types of
pluralization in norm-making processes which have been mentioned
above-and especially the increased participation of non-state
actors-should certainly not disguise the fact that states have
retained significant control over international lawmaking processes. 28
These scholars have argued that, in at least some contexts, states
have conversely preserved their clout.29 Such a preservation of state
dominance, according to that view, has manifested itself in various
manners. First, it may be the consequence of continuous intensive
lawmaking activity through the classical treaty-making system,
which remains very state-centric. 30 This is also visible in the steady
use of existing international institutional lawmaking mechanisms
where states still wield important privileges as well as influence. The
best example thereof is the creation of wide-ranging and binding
rules by states through the United Nations Security Council,31

See generally Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public InternationalLaw:
27.
Between Technique and Politics 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 2007, on the discourses about the
pluralization of the substance of law.
28.
d'Aspremont, Non-State Actors in InternationalLaw: Oscillating Between
Concepts and Dynamics, supra note 17, at 4; see also Andrew Clapham, Human Rights
Obligationsof Non-State Actors 5-6 (2006) ("Whether globalization is really leading to
the demise of the nation state is still an open question. It may be argued that, in at
least some contexts, the globalization of certain decision-making processes is actually
leading to a greater role for the state . . . ."). This is also acknowledged by A. Peters, T.
F6rster & L. Koechlin, Towards Non-state Actors as Effective, Legitimate, and
Accountable StandardSetters, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS 496-97 (A.
Peters et al. eds., 2009); d'Aspremont, Non-state Actors from the Perspective of Legal
Positivism, supra note 8, at 22-28 (outlining generally legal scholars' opinions about
the pluralization of international lawmaking).
29.
This is also an argument made by BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 3, at 97.
As an example, consider the area of international economic law (e.g., the
30.
overhaul of the international economic order through the Final Act of the 1986-1994
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations or the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change). Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994,1867 U.N.T.S. 154; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, opened for signature May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, S. Treaty Doc. No. 10238. See also d'Aspremont, Non-state Actors from the Perspective of Legal Positivism,
supra note 8, at 22-28.
31.
See generally S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001)
(adopting a wide-ranging antiterrorism resolution); Stefan Talmon, The Security
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including rules

regulating the

activities

of non-state

actors

themselves.32

The idea of resilience of the state amidst pluralization of
international lawmaking is said not to be limited to an increased use
of the classical methods of lawmaking.33 The emergence of new types
of lawmaking has arguably also reinforced the dominant position of
states.3 4 A good example can be inferred from the practice whereby
individual government agencies and actors negotiate directly with
their foreign partners, giving rise to new transnational regulatory
frameworks (TRNs).3 5 Indeed, the TRNs can also be read as an
illustration of the extent of the power of states exercised outside
traditional lawmaking frameworks. 36 This can be explained as the
result of a deliberate endeavor by states to cast norms or standards
outside the classical lawmaking processes. 37 This is done with a view

Council as World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 175 (2005) (speaking of the UN
Security Council as an "international legislator"); see also d'Aspremont, Non-State

Actors in International Law: OscillatingBetween Concepts and Dynamics, supra note
17, at 4.
32.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 942,
7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/942 (Sept. 23, 1994)
(reinforcing measures against Bosnian Serb forces); S.C. Res. 864,
19-21, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/864 (Sept. 15, 1993) (establishing sanctions against UNITA). On this practice of
the Security Council and its ability to create obligations for non-state actors, see
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, 450-51 (July 22).

33.
See generally Jean d'Aspremont, Inclusive Law-Making and LawEnforcement Processes for an Exclusive InternationalLegal System, in PARTICIPANTS IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 425 (Jean d'Aspremont ed., 2011) (discussing the resiliency of
the state and its ability to react and adapt).
34.
Id. at 431.
35.
See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, 18-19 (2004)
(explaining that a "new world order of government networks" will "compliment and
strengthen" current infrastructure); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government

Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 1041, 1061-62 (2002-2003) (noting that national agencies can facilitate
"horizontal cross-fertilization" with their foreign counterparts); see also Kal Raustiala,

The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the
Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (2002-2003) (noting that
contemporary international cooperation is occurring between discrete, specialized
agencies of governments that are "increasingly networking with their counterparts

abroad"); d'Aspremont, Non-State Actors in International Law: Oscillating Between
Concepts and Dynamics, supra note 17, at 5. For some recent critical reappraisal, see

Pierre-Hugues Verdier, TransnationalRegulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE
J. INT'L L. 113, 122-24 (2009); Gregory Shaffer, TransnationalLegal Process and State
Change: Opportunitiesand Constraints 6-15 (New York Univ. Law Sch. Inst. for Int'l
Law and Justice, Working Paper No. 2010/4, 2012), available at www..iilj.org/
publications/documents/2010-4.Shaffer.pdf.
See SLAUGHTER, supra note 35, at 3-4 (discussing the thriving TRNs);
36.

d'Aspremont, Non-State Actors in InternationalLaw: OscillatingBetween Concepts and
Dynamics, supra note 17, at 5.
In the same sense, see E. Benvenisti, Coalitions of the Willing and the
37.
Evolution of Informal International Law, in COALITIONS OF THE WILLING -
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to bypassing the rigidity and accountability constraints-although
they are limited-inherent in the making of formal rules of
international law.3 8 According to that view, states remain present
and influential, even in fields where they are not naturally dominant,
without yielding to any accountability mechanisms.3 9 Those
recognizing the resilience of state dominance have simultaneously
submitted that these developments do not necessarily contradict the
unique contemporary contribution of non-state actors to lawmaking
processes. 40 These two simultaneous phenomena may simply
manifest a complexity never observed before. 41
The idea of resilient state dominance remains controversial. At
the empirical level, it is probably where most controversies are
located. Yet, such limited controversies on the remaining clout of
states do not suffice to obfuscate the overall consensus according to
which, from an empirical perspective, international lawmaking
processes have undergone dramatic pluralization. This consensus at
the empirical level is, however, where the scholarly concord ends.
Indeed, at the conceptual level, when it comes to making sense of
international lawmaking as a whole, the international legal
scholarship is riven by deep conceptual disagreements. It is the object
of the following paragraphs to spell out some of these paradigmatic
divides.

AVANTGARDE OR THREAT? 2 (Calliess, C. Nolte & G. Stoll eds., Gbttinger Studien zum
Volker - und Europarecht, Bd. 8, 2008); see also Verdier, supra note 35, at 171-72;
d'Aspremont, Non-State Actors in InternationalLaw: Oscillating Between Concepts and
Dynamics, supra note 17, at 5.
38.
See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence
of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 29 (2005) (illustrating
how GAL aims to compensate for the lack of accountability of these new forms of
lawmaking); see also Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for
Principlesand Values, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 187,195-97 (2006); Joost Pauwelyn, Mapping
the Action and Testing Concepts of Accountability and Effectiveness, 3-9 (Project
Framing Paper, May 31, 2010), available at http://www.hiil.org/assets/902
PublicationTransnationalConstituionalityIIPPM FramingPaper_- Pauwelyn.draft_3
1_May 2010.pdf (noting that informal international lawmaking "dispenses with certain
formalities traditionally linked to international law," making it less accountable).
39.
For further discussion of this, see d'Aspremont, Non-State Actors in
InternationalLaw: Oscillating Between Concepts and Dynamics, supranote 17.
40.
See dAspremont, Inclusive Law-Making and Law-Enforcement Processes
for an Exclusive International Legal System, supra note 33, at 430-31 (noting the
importance of non-state actors in the international lawmaking processes and that
"states remain the ultimate law-makers").
41.
d'Aspremont, Non-State Actors in International Law: Oscillating Between
Concepts and Dynamics, supranote 17, at 1.
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III. CONCEPTUAL DISCORD: THE PARADIGMATIC DIVIDES IN THE
COGNITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING

The previous Part argued that, notwithstanding the limited
debates as to the actual extent of the resilience of state dominance,
the finding that international lawmaking is undergoing a sweeping
pluralization has mustered a wide consensus among observers,
experts, scholars, and practitioners. How they make sense of it,
however, shows great divergences among them. Indeed, despite
concurring on their empirical finding, observers, experts, scholars,
and practitioners disagree in the treatment thereof and, in particular,
in the way they cognize the multiplicity of actors whose participation
has been empirically apprehended. This Part seeks to outline some of
the main cognitive discrepancies found in the literature.
As was mentioned in the introductory observations of this
Article, five main approaches to lawmaking seem to permeate the
literature: a static approach grounded in the concept of subjecthood,
another static understanding informed by the concept of pedigree, a
dynamic conception of lawmaking based on participation, a dynamic
conception based on the exercise of public authority, and, eventually,
a perspective that-while primarily static-aims at bridging the
pedigree-based conception of lawmaking with social processes. These
approaches will be introduced here in the chronological order of their
emergence in international legal scholarship. Being the traditional
cognitive take on norm-generating processes, subjecthood and
pedigree are the first forms of cognition of international lawmaking
that ought to be mentioned (Part III.A and Part III.B). Because the
conceptions based on participation arose in reaction to static
approaches, they are subsequently examined (Part III.C). Because
they tried to offset the cognitive limitations of participation-based
conceptions of lawmaking while trying to accommodate greater
dynamism, output-based perspectives (Part III.D) and neoformalist
pedigree-based approaches (Part III.E) ought to be mentioned last.
A. Subject-Based Approaches to Lawmaking
The subject-based approach to lawmaking seems to have been
42
ingrained in the very early systematization of international law.
Indeed, the appellation international law directly refers to its main
"fabricants," for it is this reference to nation-states as the makers of
international law that prodded Jeremy Bentham's An Introduction to

For a historical account of the concept of subject, see the fascinating work of
42.
JANNE E. NIJMAN, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (2004).
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the Principles of Morals and Legislation to coin the expression
internationallaw.43
According to this approach, the makers of international law were
deemed-originally the sole-subjects of international law in that
they enjoyed legal personality. A correlation was thus established
between states as the makers of international law and subjecthood.44
In this sense, "[i]nternational law is conceived of as horizontal law, in
which the subjects of the law are also the makers of the law."45 The
kinship so established between prominence in lawmaking and
subjecthood constituted a prejudice that permeated the legal
scholarship for more than a century. As a result, lawmaking
processes had always been perceived-despite being a common object
of study in political science and international relationS46-as falling
outside the scope of legal scholarly inquiries.4 7 Lawmaking was seen
as a matter for subjects of international law. An entity not qualifying
as a subject could not claim to be participating in lawmaking.
Interestingly, it is this very prejudice between the prominent
lawmaking role of states and subjecthood that long barred the
recognition of an international legal personality for international

43.
See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION 325-27 (MacMillan & Co. 2005) (using the phrase international law
and discussing the origin of international law).
44.
See Russia v. Turkey, 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 870 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1912) (illustrating
the correlation between states as makers of international law and subjecthood); see also
J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS OXFORD 1, 41 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed.
1963) (noting that states hold the power to make international law and are inherently
subject to it); T. J. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-14 (McMillan
& Co., 7th ed. 1927) (discussing the notion that all states, particularly those "civilized
states" that make international law, are subject to international law); L. OPPENHEIM, 1
INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-19 (R.F. Roxburgh ed., 8th ed. 1955) ("Since the Law of
Nations is based on the common consent of individual States, States are the principal
subjects of International Law."). Compare CHARLES E. ROUSSEAU, 1 PRINCIPES
GtNeRAUX DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 1, 3 (tditions A. Pedone 1944) (qualifying
the affirmation that international law only regulates relations between states), with

Hans Kelsen, Thdorie gindrale du droit internationalpublic, 42 Recueil des Cours pt.
IV 182, 183 (1932) (noting that international law has no inherent "domaine de validit6

matiriel").
45.

Philip Allott, The True Function of Law in the InternationalCommunity, 5

IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 391, 404 (1998).
46.
See, e.g., GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD (Joseph S. Nye & John D.
Donahue eds., 2000) (illustrating how the lawmaking process has been a common
object of study in political science); GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND
CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (James Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992)
(same); JAMES ROSENAU, THE STUDY OF WORLD POLITICS, 2 GLOBALIZATION AND
GOVERNANCE (Routledge 2006) (same); Joseph S. Nye & Robert 0. Keohane,

TransnationalRelations and World Politics:An Introduction,25 INT'L ORG. 329 (1971)

(same).

47.

See d'Aspremont,

Non-State Actors From the Perspective of Legal

Positivism, supra note 8, at 24 (illustrating that lawmaking processes in the past were
not discussed in legal scholarly work).
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organizations.4 8 Indeed, for several decades, scholars and judges
resisted the claim that international organizations could enjoy
subjecthood for reasons pertaining to the abovementioned lawmaking
prejudice. 49 It is in this sense that, in the opinion of this author, the
1949 International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on the
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations
(Reparations)produced a liberating effect.50 This opinion formed a
"constitutionalizing"5 1 breaking point because lawmaking and
subjecthood came to be severed from one another. Indeed, in the case
of international organizations, subjecthood was accordingly no longer
derived from their lawmaking role but rather from their functions
(the objective school) or the will of their creators (the subjective
school).52 The severance between lawmaking and subjecthood
performed in the mid-twentieth century bore two main consequences
that ought to be mentioned here.
First, as a result of the disconnection of legal personality from
lawmaking, the question of subjecthood came to arise with respect to
all kinds of other actors who did not directly participate in
lawmaking. In addition to international organizations having legal
personality, a number of other non-state actors came to be recognized
as international legal persons, although this has been perceived as an
indirect consequence stemming from them having rights and duties,
rather than the consequence of direct conferral of international legal
personality upon non-state actors.53 This has thus not put into
question the state-centricism of the pre-Reparations era. Indeed, it
was not contested that the rights and obligations that non-state
actors may bear have arguably remained the outcome of lawmaking

48.

See David J. Bederman, The Souls of International Organizations: Legal

Personalityand the Lighthouse at Cape Spartel, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 275, 277 (1995-1996)
(discussing the international legal personality of international organizations).

49.

See R. Collins, Classical Positivism in International Law Revisited, in

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL POSITIVISM IN A POST-MODERN WORLD (Jean d'Aspremont &
Jorg Kammerhofer eds., forthcoming 2013) (providing historical narratives on the
development of international law).
50.
Reparations of Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 174-89 (Apr. 11).
51.
See Bederman, supra note 48, at 277-80 (providing an in-depth discussion

of Reparations).
52.
For some critical remarks, see Richard Collins, Non-State Actors in
International Institutional Law, in PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 311,
315-17 (Jean d'Aspremont ed., 2011).
53.
This has led some scholars to describe the question of international legal
personality as "circular," "sterile," and boiling down to an "intellectual prison." See
August Reinisch, The ChangingInternationalLegal Frameworkfor Dealing with NonState Actors, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 37, 69-72 (Philip Alston ed.,*
2005); Clapham, supra note 28, at 59-63; d'Aspremont, Non-state Actors from the
Perspective of Legal Positivism, supra note 8, at 25.
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processes where the dominance of the state is central.54 Above all, it
was continuously said that a formal international legal personality
derived from their rights and duties could well be recognized to these
actors but that this falls short of formally elevating them to actual
lawmakers.5 5 Thus, the severance between legal personality and
lawmaking allowed the recognition of a legal personality to actors
deprived of any major lawmaking powers.
The second consequence of the mid-twentieth century
dissociation between lawmaking and subjecthood is the exact
opposite. It is not that legal personality was recognized to actors
without lawmaking powers. It is rather that lawmaking roles were
recognized for a new range of actors not necessarily endowed with
legal personality. In the post-Reparations era, participation in
lawmaking does not turn the actor concerned into a new legal
subject. 56
It must be acknowledged here that, while the severance between
lawmaking and subjecthood quickly gained widespread acceptance,
some reactionaries continued to deduct legal status from participation
in lawmaking, not in the form of subjecthood but rather in the form of
a formal lawmaker status. This "light subjecthood thesis" is at the
heart of these legal scholars who inferred from developments of a new
international lawmaking framework, described in Part II, a formal
status of lawmaker.5 7 In the same vein, a significant group of
scholars, even though they recognize that that contemporary
lawmaking processes are still fundamentally state-centric, argue that
granting a lawmaking status to non-state actors should at least be
promoted and vindicated.5 8 A significant number of international
54.
d'Aspremont, The Doctrinal Illusion of the Heterogeneity of International
Lawmaking Processessupra note 4, at 303-07.
See, e.g., Georges Abi-Saab, Cours Gindral de Droit InternationalPublic, in
55.
207, pt. VIII RECUEIL DES COURS 39 (1987); d'Aspremont, Non-state Actors from the
Perspective of Legal Positivism, supra note 8, at 25.
56.
On this point, see d'Aspremont, The Doctrinal Illusion of the Heterogeneity
of InternationalLawmaking Processes supra note 4, at 305-09.
57.
See, e.g., Menno T. Kamminga, The Evolving Status of NGOs Under
International Law: A Threat to the Inter-State System?, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 93, 109-11 (Philip Alston ed., 2005) (noting that, while their role still is
weak, NGOs are taking a more formal role in the realm of international lawmaking);
Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralismin the World Society, in GLOBAL
LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 13-14 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997) (referring to contracting
in the global context, "as [a] source of law ... on equal footing with judge-made law and
legislation"); W. Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformation of the
World Constitutive Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, 11
EUR. J. INT'L L. 3, 16-18 (2000) (highlighting the self-legitimizing attitude of
interveners purporting to remedy human rights violations but not acting with any
formal legal authority).
58.
See generally ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY 189-97 (1999) (encouraging interdisciplinary cooperation to identify non-state
actors participating in "authoritative practice" whose activities are "intended to give
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legal scholars thus advocate the idea of a lawmaking role for nonstate actors.5 9 This continuous scholarly appeal of the junction
between lawmaking and personality has, however, remained too
isolated and marginal. This is why it is not further explored here.
For the sake of the argument made here, it must be pointed out
that the main outcome of such a perspective is that the pluralization
mentioned in Part II could be cognized short of legal personality. Said
differently, the subject-based model, once severed from lawmaking,
has allowed its proponents to more easily recognize the pluralization
of international lawmaking processes.
Yet, even severed from legal personality, such a subject-based
approach remained burdened with cognitive deficiencism, which
explains its limited success in the literature. Indeed, it is argued here
that it is not only that such an approach fails to capture normgenerative activities between subjects that are not legal persons. It is
also that, even with respect to these norm-generating processes
between legal persons, the cognitive value of subjecthood is limited.
Indeed, it has always been close to impossible to formally certify the
existence of subjects of international law for their identification has
inextricably remained immune from any apprehension through
formal categories, which can be understood as much the cause as the
consequence of the fundamentally political nature of the processes of
identification of subjects on the international plane. The
identification of states should suffice to illustrate this point. Indeed,
in this respect, international law continues to be almost exclusively
dependent on recognition. International legal scholars-who
classically resent such political contingencies-have nonetheless long
tried to make the point that the determination of the subjects of
international law is a matter for international law. 60 Such a legalist
position has informed the scholarly construction of the three- or fourelement theories of statehood. 61 Even though some international legal
rise to the creation of legal rules"); Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of
a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of PopularSovereignty, 36 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 191 (2000) (advocating for a popularly elected global legislative body);
d'Aspremont, Non-state Actors from the Perspective of Legal Positivism, supra note 8, at
26.
It is also particularly well illustrated by the fact that scholars have
59.
witnessed the creation of a special law journal devoted to the question (Non-State
Actors and InternationalLaw-published by Brill until 2005) or that of a book series
initiated by Math Noortmann (Non-State Actors in International Law, Politics and
Governance-published by Ashgate).
60.
See, e.g., JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 40-42 (Clarendon Press 2d ed. 2006) (stating that "statehood is ... a central
concept of international law . . . ." and setting out five "exclusive and general legal
characteristics of States"); d'Aspremont, Non-State Actors in International Law:
Oscillating Between Concepts and Dynamics, supranote 17, at 2.
For a critical presentation, see Thomas Grant, Defining Statehood: The
61.
Montevideo Convention and Its Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 403 (1999).
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rules, like those pertaining to self-determination, human rights, and
democracy, may occasionally impinge on the formation of new
subjects and the gender of the newborn, 62 this mirage-which I call
the Montevideo mirage 63-has not sufficed to make identification of
the subjects of international law a formal process and rein in the
politics of subject certification. 6 4 As far as non-state actors are
concerned, their identification may prove even more elusive. It is not
difficult to understand that this impossibility to formally certify the
existence of subjects of international law, aggravated by the
overarching determinative roles of recognition and the illusion of
formalism behind the theories of statehood, has reinforced the move
away from the subject-based approach to lawmaking and paved the
way for other approaches to lawmaking. Such alternative approaches
are now examined.
B. Static Pedigree-BasedApproaches to Lawmaking
Either from the very beginning or as a result of the
abovementioned severance of lawmaking power and subjecthood,
many international legal scholars have long shied away from
approaching international lawmaking from the vantage point of the
legal personality. Rather, they argue that it is only as soon as the
normative product of a process is identified as law that this process
can properly be considered a lawmaking process. In that sense,
qualification as a lawmaking process hinges on the normative product
thereof. Only when the latter is identified by virtue of its pedigree as
law can the norm-generating process concerned be considered
lawmaking. This approach to lawmaking, albeit not the initial one, is
possibly the most dominant one. 65

62.
See generally Jean d'Aspremont, Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of
Democracy, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 877 (2006) (drawing a distinction between
"legitimacy of origin" and legitimacy of exercise" and discussing changes in legitimacy
through the "qualification" of new governments and "disqualification" of failed
governments); Jean d'Aspremont, Post-Conflict Administrations as DemocracyBuilding Instruments, 9 CHI. J. INTIL L. 1 (2008) (analyzing "the use of international
administrations of territories to create or to reconstruct democratic states"); Jean
d'Aspremont, Regulating Statehood: The Kosovo Status Settlement, 20 LEIDEN J. INT'L
L. 649 (2007) (discussing the status settlement "of unprecedented extent" in the 2007
UN-proposed regulation of statehood for Kosovo); d'Aspremont, Non-State Actors in
InternationalLaw: OscillatingBetween Concepts and Dynamics, supranote 17, at 2.
63.
By reference to the famous 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States (the Convention), which, for the sake of the Convention, elaborates on
the criteria an entity should satisfy to be considered a state. d'Aspremont, Non-State
Actors in InternationalLaw: Oscillating Between Concepts and Dynamics, supra note
17, at 1-2.
Id.
64.
65.
For an overview of that approach in the contemporary legal scholarship, see
D'ASPREMONT, FORMALIsM, supra note 11, at ch. 3.
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This view came to prevail in twentieth-century international
legal scholarship. Scholars of the twentieth century, having resolutely
retreated from the dualism of natural law, endorsed a rule-based
approach or source-based approach of law identification. 66 In their
great majority, these twentieth-century scholars did not shed the idea
of their predecessors that international law rests on the consent of
the primary lawmakers. Subject to a few exceptions, 67 they agreed
that natural law does not constitute a source of law per se, although
the content of rules may reflect some principles of morality. 68 The
consensus on the idea that the will of the state is the most obvious
material source of law69 remained unchallenged.70 The main
difference between nineteenth-century and twentieth-century
international legal scholars lies in the fact that the latter tried to

66.

See, e.g., T. J. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-14

(Percy H. Winfield ed., 7th ed. 1923) (stating that international law is a "historical
investigation of what [the rules between states] are" rather than an "a priori inquiry
into what the rules of international intercourse ought to be" and that states adopt
"rules which can be shown to have been adopted in similar circumstances by all or most
states" rather than rules "deduced from the consideration of absolute rights"); L.
OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 92 (1st ed. 1905) ("We know nowadays

that a Law of Nature does not exist .... Only a positive Law of Nations can be a
branch of the science of law."); Paul Guggenheim, What is Positive InternationalLaw?,
in LAW AND POLITICS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 15 (George A. Lipsky ed., 1953)
(arguing for the autonomy of positive law over the natural law doctrine and the
sociological theory of international law). See generally G. SCHWARZENBERGER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1957) (discussing the types of institutions in international
law); L. Oppenheim, The Science of InternationalLaw: Its Task and Method, 2 AM. J.
INT'L L. 315 (1908) ("The rules of the present international law are to a great extent not
written rules, but based on custom.").
67.
See G. Fitzmaurice, Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of
InternationalLaw, in SYMBOLAE VERZIJL 161-68 (Martinus Nijhoff ed., 1958) (Fr.)
(exploring natural law as a formal source of law); L. LE FUR, La thdorie du droit naturel
depuis le XVIIdme si&le et la doctrine moderne [The Theory of Natural Law Since the
Seventeenth Century and the Modern Doctrine], 18 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 259-442 (1927) (Fr.).

68.

See J. Basdevant, Rfgles gin4rales du droit de la paix [General Rules of

Law of Peace], 58 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW 477-78 (1936) (Fr). This came to be reflected in the case law as well. See the
statement of the ICJ in the South West Africa case: "It is a court of law, and can take
account of moral principles only in so far as these are given sufficient expression in
legal form." South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Mr.), Second Phase,
Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 6, 49 (July 18).
69.
On the distinction between material and formal sources, see L. OPPENHEIM,
1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (8th ed. 1955). See also C. ROUSSEAU, 1 PRINCIPES GtNtRAUX
DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

LAW] 106-08 (Pedone 1944) (Fr.); P. E. Corbett, The Consent of States and the Sources
of the Law of Nations, 5 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 20-30 (1925) (discussing the sources of
international law); Fitzmaurice, supra note 67, at 153.
70.
For a more recent manifestation of the voluntary nature of international
law, see generally P. Weil, Towards Normative Relativity in InternationalLaw?, 77 AM.
J. INT'L L. 413 (1983). For a judicial expression of that idea, see S.S. Lotus, Collection of
Judgments, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
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devise formal law-ascertaining criteria with which to capture state
consent. 7 ' This is precisely how twentieth-century scholars ended up
grounding the identification of international legal rules in a theory of
allegedly formal sources 7 2-a construction that continues to enjoy
strong support among twenty-first-century scholars.7 3 In their view,
international legal rules stem from the will of states expressed
through one of the formal sources of international law. The systemic
character of the theory of the sources, which they elaborated, proved
instrumental in their vision of international law as constituting a
system. 74 It simultaneously allowed international lawmaking to be
captured through prisms alien to legal personality because only the
formal source of law-and the relevant pedigree associated with each
source-is relevant for the apprehension of international lawmaking.
It is true that, among those scholars who abide by such a sourcebased approach to lawmaking, there has not been a consensus on the
exact sources-the pedigree inherent in each of them-that ought to
be recognized as the main cognitive tool to capture international
lawmaking. Although being a mere list of the applicable law of a
given judicial body, 75 the endless debate about the ambit, meaning,
and authority of the list of admitted sources of Article 38 of the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and later of
the ICJ7 6 has been very symptomatic of these remaining
disagreements. Certainly, here is not the place to revisit these
controversies.
More important is to emphasize the consequences of such a
dominant pedigree-based approach to the cognition of international
lawmaking. It is argued here that, like the subjecthood perspective,

71.

See generally O.A. ELIAS & C.L. LIM, THE PARADOX OF CONSENSUALISM IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998) (refining the theory of consent).

See Alain Pellet, Cours Gindral: le Droit Internationalentre souverainet6 et
72.
communautg international [General Course: International Law between Sovereignty
and International Community] (2007) (Fr.); 2 ANUARIO BRASILEIRO DE DIREITO
INTERNACIONAL [BRAZILIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAw] 12, 15, 19, 31 (2007)
(Braz.).
73.
See, e.g., ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, THE INTERPRETATION OF ACTS AND
RULES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 51-60 (2008) (discussing the "threshold of legal

regulation in international law").
74.
Likewise, it cannot be excluded that the practice of law-applying
authorities will itself yield contradictions. That does not bar the practice from
providing a meaning to law-ascertainment criteria. See, e.g., Anne-Charlotte
Martineau, The Rhetoric of Fragmentation:Fear and Faith in International Law, 22
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 1, 7-8 (2009) (discussing unity and diversity in the systematic
formulation of international law).
See Alain Pellet, Article 38, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
75.
OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 731-870 (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012).
On the controversies that occurred during the drafting process of Article 38,
76.
see THOMAS SKOUTERIS, THE NOTION OF PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW DISCOURSE
121-26 (2010).
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the pedigree-based approach is very exclusionary. As long as the
norm produced is not formally ascertainable as law, the process of its
creation will not be recognized as a formal lawmaking process-and
its epistemic interest will be deemed very limited.
Likewise, it is worth realizing that such an approach to
lawmaking rests on an ex post facto reconstruction. Indeed, it is only
once a given rule is recognized as a rule of law that the process
leading thereto will be endowed with the status of a lawmaking
process. For instance, if an agreement is recognized as a treaty, the
negotiations and the-formal or informal-process preceding that
agreement will be elevated into a treaty-making process.
It is not difficult to understand that, as a result of these cognitive
effects of the pedigree-based approach to international lawmaking,
the explanatory virtue of such a static approach to lawmaking,
irrespective of its other merits-for instance, in terms of rulelimited. As is well-known, these
ascertainment 7 7-remains
explanatory and descriptive deficiencies led to the emergence of more
dynamic approaches grounded in the concept of participation.
C. Dynamic Participation-BasedApproaches to Lawmaking
The explanatory and descriptive handicaps of the static approach
to lawmaking, whether based on subjecthood or pedigree, have led, in
the second half of the twentieth century, to a move away from any
formal category to describe lawmaking. This turn-sometimes
described as the instrumentalist turn7 8-came to be embodied by the
famous scholars at Yale Law School in New Haven, Connecticut. The
New Haven School is premised on the inability of formal conceptswhether subjecthood or pedigree-to describe the multiple facets of
lawmaking or capture the great variety of legal actors involved
therein. Scholars affiliated with the New Haven School invite
international legal scholars to move away from any attempt to
formally identify the international legal subjects (and from the
correlative concept of legal personality) and, rather, to espouse the far
more intricate and multilayered notion of "participants." They
contend that the static notion of subject as well as that of pedigree of
rules are too narrow to capture the various aspects of lawmaking
processes and that a more dynamic concept like that of participation
should be embraced with a view to apprehending these various fluxes
in which law originates. Such a contention was of course not
accidental. It was the result of their conceptual assumption that law

77.
On the question of law ascertainment, see generally D'ASPREMONT,
FORMALISM, supra note 11. See also id. at chs. 1, 2.
78.
See Martti Koskenniemi, What is International Law For?, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW 57-81 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006).

1138

VANDERBILT/OURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 46:1119

is primarily a process of decision making rather than a defined set of
rules and obligations.7 9 According to Myles S. McDougal,
international law is
a comprehensive process of authoritative decision in which rules are
continuously made and remade; that the function of the rules of
international law is to communicate the perspectives (demands,
identifications and expectations) of the peoples of the world about this
comprehensive process of decision; and that the rational application of
these rules in particular instances requires their interpretation, like
that of any other communication, in terms of who is using them, with
respect to whom, for what purposes (major and minor), and in what
context.

80

Worded differently, international law is "a flow of decision in which
community prescriptions are formulated, invalidated, and in fact
applied."8 1 In the same vein, Rosalyn Higgins sees international law
as "the whole process of competent persons making authoritative
decisions in response to claims which various parties are pressing
upon them, in respect of various views and interests."8 2 In sum,
international law is accordingly regarded as a comprehensive process
of decision making rather than as a defined set of rules and
obligations.8 3 In the context of this Article, it will not come as a
surprise that, if law is envisaged as a process, scholars are brought to

79.
See generally HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDOUGAL,
JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY (1992) (articulating and exploring the
deliberative, problem-solving, and decision-making purposes of law); MYRES S.
McDOUGAL & WILLIAM MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 5 (1980); Myres S. McDougal, InternationalLaw and the Future, 50 MIss.
L.J. 259 (1979) ("In its most useful conception ... law is regarded as a process of
authoritative decision through which the members of a community seek to clarify and
secure their common interests."); Myres S. McDougal, InternationalLaw, Power, and
Policy, 82 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133
(1953); Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michasel Reisman, Theories
about InternationalLaw: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L.
188 (1968) (discussing the role of decisionmakers and scholars in choosing a plan of
international jurisprudence); d'Aspremont, Non-State Actors in International Law:
Oscillating Between Concepts and Dynamics, supranote 17, at 2.
Myres S. McDougal, A Footnote, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 383 (1963).
80.
McDougal, Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 79, at 181.
81.
Rosalyn Higgins, Policy Considerations and the International Judicial
82.
Process, 17 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 58, 59 (1968).
83.
See generally LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE
SOCIETY, supra note 79 (articulating and exploring the deliberative, problem-solving,
and decision-making purposes of law); MCDOUGAL & REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, supra note 79; McDougal, International Law and the
Future, supra note 79 ("In its most useful conception ... law is regarded as a process of
authoritative decision through which the members of a community seek to clarify and
secure their common interests. . . ."); McDougal, InternationalLaw, Power, and Policy,
supra note 80 (discussing the role of decision makers and scholars); McDougal et al.,
Theories about InternationalLaw: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence,supra
note 79.
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observe a more complex field of inquiry that requires a different type
of sophistication and more dynamic concepts, like that of
participation. 84
While it brought about a renewed interest in process-based
understandings and the cross-disciplinary perspectives that
accompanied them, the New Haven School approach was never
immune from criticism. Some of these broadsides may explain why
the policy-oriented approach can be seen as having failed to thwart
the adherence to formal law ascertainment that has dominated
mainstream international legal scholarship, at least until recently.8 5
It is noteworthy that a great deal of the criticism leveled against the
process-based approach of the New Haven School originated in the
suspicion that its proponents were in collusion with American foreign
policy decision makers. According to that criticism, the New Haven
School was geared toward the legitimization of American foreign
policy. 8 6 If this is true, the New Haven School shows itself vulnerable
to the same criticisms as naturalism.8 7 Others have objected that the
New Haven approach does not provide enough guidance as to
whether a given behavior is wrongful or not.88 For if the policyoriented schools understand the "authoritative" character of the
process so broadly, then international law comes to be
indiscriminately encapsulating of any decision made by any
international decision maker and generates a lot of uncertainty.8 9

84.
On the idea of participation, see d'Aspremont, Non-State Actors in
InternationalLaw: OscillatingBetween Concepts and Dynamics, supranote 17, at 1-2.
85.
See the remarks of R. A. Falk, according to whom the New Haven School
cannot survive the vision of its founders. See R.A. Falk, Casting the Spell: The New
Haven School of InternationalLaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1991, 1997 (1995).
86.
This has famously been explained by James Hathaway, America, Defender
of Democratic Legitimacy, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121, 130 (2000). In the same sense, see
JAMES HATHAWAY, RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (2005); Falk,

supra note 85; Christian Tomuschat, International Law: Ensuring the Survival of
Mankind on the Eve of a New Century, General Course on Public InternationalLaw, in
281 RECUEIL DES COURS 10, 26-29 (1999).

87.
See Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32
HARV. INT'L L.J. 81, 86 (1991) (pointing out that "the [p]olicy-approach could be
collapsed into naturalism" and noting the criticisms that emerge because of this);
Hathaway, America, Defender of DemocraticLegitimacy, supra note 86, at 128 (stating
that the New Haven School depletes international law of the certainty required for
meaningful accountability); HATHAWAY, RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL

LAW, supra note 86, at 21 ("The policy-oriented school of international law has thus
spawned a new version of natural law thinking under which the will of powerful states
is simply substituted for that of God or nature.").
88.

HATHAWAY, RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note

86, at 22. For a tentative rebuttal of that type of criticism, see ROSLYN HIGGINS,
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT 8 (1995).

89.
See Anthony D'Amato, Is InternationalLaw Really Law?, 79 Nw. U. L. REV.
1293, 1302 (1984-1985) (asserting that the New Haven School approach comes
perilously close to stating that any international contention, whether or not couched in
legal language, becomes law).
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Such uncertainty can preclude international law from offering
"meaningful accountability."9 0 The ensuing arbitrariness cannot be
avoided without returning to a rule-based approach. 9 '
Whatever the actual success of the New Haven School, its legacy,
when it comes to cognizing lawmaking, is dramatic. Indeed, the
sweeping move toward the study of lawmaking as a set of processes
rather than through the lens of formal subjects or lawmakers is a
move that can partly be attributed to the influence wielded by schools
like the New Haven School.92 Indeed, with the exception of the
specific difficulties of international convention-making processes,
lawmaking by international organizations, and other limited
exceptions, lawmaking processes, according to the static approaches
described above, had always been understood-despite being a
common object of study in political science and international
relations 9 3-as situating themselves outside the ambit of legal
scholarly inquiries. 94 In that sense, the spectrum of cognition brought

90.
HATHAWAY, RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
86, at 18.
See Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in a Post-Realist Era, 16
91.
AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 8 (1995) ("We have recourse to legal rules precisely because
organizing social life directly on values turned out to be impossible; values are too
general as policy guidelines when formulated so that all would agree.").
92.
See generally ABRAM CHAYES, THOMAS EHRLICH & ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD,
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTORY COURSE (1968)
(collecting problems and examples for an introductory international law course that
detail international legal processes). See Mary Ellen O'Connell, New International
Legal Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 334, 349 (1999) (noting that the "International Legal
Process" shares much with the New Haven approach but can be distinguished in "ways
similar to the distinctions American legal process scholars drew between themselves
and the legal realists"); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?,
106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2642-43 (1997) (discussing the various iterations of the legal
process in international law theory); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing
InternationalLaw Home, 35 HOUs. L. REV. 623, 653 (1998) (arguing that international
law acquires "stickiness" and "obedience" through the transnational legal process,
which consists of a repeated cycle of interaction, internalization, and interpretation).
See Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transnational Relations and
93.
World Politics: An Introduction, 25 INT'L ORG. 329, 332-33 (1971) (differentiating
"interstate" actions from "transnational" actions and actors); GOVERNANCE IN A
GLOBALIZING WORLD (Joseph S. Nye & John D. Donahue eds., 2000) (collecting various
studies of international treaty-making and ordering processes); GOVERNANCE WITHOUT
GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (James Rosenau & Ernst-Otto
Czempiel eds., 1992) (providing sources that demonstrate how governance occurs in
world politics); JAMES ROSENAU, 2 THE STUDY OF WORLD POLITICS: GLOBALIZATION
AND GOVERNANCE 1-3 (2006) (collecting sources detailing the dynamics and
governance of globalization in the post-Cold War world); d'Aspremont, Non-State
Actors in InternationalLaw: Oscillating Between Concepts and Dynamics, supra note
17, at 6.
See d'Aspremont, Non-State Actors From the Perspective of Legal
94.
Positivism, supra note 8, at 31 (explaining the important role of international legal
scholars as the "grammarians" of the language of international law).
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about by the New Haven School dramatically outpaced that of the
static subject- and pedigree-based approaches mentioned above.
The consequences of such a new cognitive approach have been
wide-ranging. Indeed, once scholars espousing a participants-based
approach eventually elevated 'lawmaking processes-or standard
setting 95-into a lofty topic worthy of scholarly research, 96 attention
turned to the participation of actors who cannot be formally
considered legal subjects. As a result, in only a few decades,
international legal scholars massively moved to the study of non-state
actors. Such a move was accompanied by a deformalization of
international law-ascertainment indicators,97 which came to
harmfully bear upon the authority and normative character of
international law as well as the ability of legal scholarship to produce
meaningful knowledge. 98 This being said, irrespective of its
consequences in terms of the authority and normativity of
international law and of the international legal scholarship, a move
away from a scholarship intensively resorting to static concepts has
allowed international lawyers to zero in on this whole series of new
participants in international lawmaking processes. 99

See generally NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS (A. Peters et al.
95.
eds., 2009) (discussing the increasing role of non-state actors in standard setting).
For some classical studies on international lawmaking processes, see
96.
DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING (R. Wolfrum & V. Roben
eds., 2005); BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 3.
See, e.g., A. Peters, T. Forster & L. Koechlin, Towards Non-State Actors as
97.
Effective, Legitimate, and Accountable Standard Setters, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS
STANDARD SETTERS 550-51 (A. Peters et al. eds., 2009) ("[T]he globalisation of law has
created a multitude of decentred lawmaking processes in various sectors of civil society,
independently of nation-states.") (internal quotations omitted); d'Aspremont, Non-State
Actors in InternationalLaw: Oscillating Between Concepts and Dynamics, supra note
17, at 7.
For an evaluation of this deformalization of law-ascertainment processes,
98.
see generally Jean d'Aspremont, The Politics of Deformalization in InternationalLaw,
3 GOETTINGEN J. INT'L L. 503 (2011). See also d'Aspremont, Non-State Actors in
InternationalLaw: OscillatingBetween Concepts and Dynamics, supra note 17, at 7.
See, e.g., NON-STATE ACTOR DYNAMICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM LAW99.
TAKERS TO LAW-MAKERS 1-5 (Math Noorthmann & Cedric Ryngaert eds., 2010)
(collecting sources dealing with transnational corporations, corporate social
responsibility, the imposition of international duties, international legal status,
contemporary world society, and international lawmaking); NON-STATE ACTORS AS
STANDARD SETTERS, supra note 95 (discussing the increasing role of non-state actors in
standard setting); NON-STATE ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Andrea Bianchi ed.,
2009) (collecting sources that detail the roles played by non-state actors in regards to
the making and studying of international law); d'Aspremont, Non-State Actors in
InternationalLaw: OscillatingBetween Concepts and Dynamics, supra note 17, at 7.
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D. Dynamic Output-Based Approaches to Lawmaking
Against the backdrop of the cognitive limitations of the
approaches to international lawmaking based on subject, pedigree, or
participation, new models of cognition of international lawmaking
have emerged in the literature focusing on the output of normgenerating processes.10 0 Although not directly centered on
international law but on the new forms of contemporary norm
making, this is also the understanding found in the Heidelberg
research project entitled the Exercise of Public Authority by
International Institutions'0o and GAL,1 02 which cognize normgenerating processes by virtue of the impact of the norm.
From such an output-based perspective, what matters is
"whether and how the subjects of norms, rules, and standards come to
accept those norms, rules, and standards,

. .

. [and] if they treat them

as authoritative, then those norms can be treated as . . . law."103 In
their view, any normative effort to influence international actors'
behavior if it materializes in the adoption of an international
instrument should be viewed as part of international law. It is argued

100.
For a few examples, see JOst E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AS LAW-MAKERS 601 (2005); Jutta Brunnie & Stephen J. Toope, InternationalLaw and
Constructivism: Elements of an International Theory of InternationalLaw, 39 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19, 65 (2000-2001). These effect-based approaches must be
distinguished from the subtle conception Kratochwil defended based upon the
principled application of a norm that refers to the explicitness and contextual variation
in the reasoning process and the application of rules like situations in the future.
FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS OF
PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC
AFFAIRS 206-08 (1989); Friedrich Kratochwil, Legal Theory and International Law, in
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 55, 58 (David Armstrong ed., 2009).
101.
See Matthias Goldmann, Inside Relative Normativity: From Sources to
Standard Instruments for the Exercise of InternationalPublic Authority, 9 GERMAN L.J.
1865, 1869 (2008) (stating that "a large part of the instruments by which international
institutions exercise authority remains beyond the reach of meaningful legal
concepts"); Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann & Matthias Goldmann, Developing the
Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global
Governance Activities, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1375, 1387 (2008) (finding, in part, that
transnational legal processes are similar to managerial approaches because they both
focus on "questions of compliance and efficiency" wherein law is "one of several means
for the effective and efficient regulation of society").
102.
See generally Kingsbury et al., supra note 38; Harlow, supra note 38;
Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Law' in Global Administrative Law, 20 EURO. J.
INT'L. L. 23, 29-31 (2009) (positing that GAL rests on an "extended Hartian conception
of law," which elevates "publicness" to a constitutive element of law where publicness
means the claim made for law that has been wrought by the whole society, by the
public, and the connected claim that law addresses matters of concern to the society as
such).
103.
On that approach, see Jan Klabbers, Law-making and Constitutionalism,
in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters
& Geir Ulfstein eds., 2009).
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here that such an effect-based (or impact-based) conception of
international law entails a shift from the perspective of the norm
maker to that of the norm user. According to that understanding,
international lawmaking is accordingly identified by its end, which is
the use of the norm by its addressee.
It is submitted here that output-based approaches resemble
pedigree-based cognition in the sense that lawmaking processes are
retroactively reconstructed. It is once the product of a normgenerating process has impacted its addressees' behaviors that such a
process is turned into a lawmaking process. Output-based
perspectives nonetheless differ from pedigree-based ones in that it is
not the normative product that comes to elevate the process in
lawmaking but its impact. Looking at lawmaking from the vantage
point of its output thus comes with a behaviorist dimension, which
makes it more dynamic than pedigree-based approaches to
lawmaking. Indeed, conceptualizations of lawmaking evolve together
with the impact of norms.
These approaches to international lawmaking have proved
rather popular among international legal scholars as a result of their
cognitive advantages. 104 Indeed, like participation-based approaches,
they allow the capture of dimensions of international lawmaking,
which subject-based and pedigree-based perspectives would leave
aside. Likewise, their dynamism permits a constant rejuvenation and
allows them to accommodate new forms of the exercise of public
authority at the international level. It must nonetheless be stressed
that they are not without problems, especially in terms of the-albeit
sometimes temporary-deformalization of law which they bring
about. 05 This is a conceptual drawback, which a fifth and last take
on international lawmaking has tried to contain while also trying to
preserve dynamism.
E. Dynamic Pedigree-BasedApproaches to Lawmaking
Looking at international law from the vantage point of
participation is not inherently linked to the New Haven School.
Arguing that law is exclusively a process is not necessarily
incompatible with a pedigree-based approach. Indeed, a last category
of scholars needs to be mentioned as they have ventured to embrace a
more formal pedigree-based conception of lawmaking without
rejecting any exploration of lawmaking from the vantage point of
participation.

104.
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
105.
See d'Aspremont, The Politics of Deformalization in International Law,
supra note 98 (studying this subject in greater detail).
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Certainly, endeavors to bring the process-based approach of the
New Haven School and the more static conceptions of international
law closer to one another are not unprecedented.10 6 It is not certain
that this reconciliation has always been successful.1 07 This author
has himself tried to reconcile static pedigree-based approaches to law
(and lawmaking) with more dynamic social processes in the law. 0 8
Indeed, while acknowledging that approaching international law from
the standpoint of its sources corresponds to a formal conception of law
zeroed in on law as a product, the author of this Article has argued
elsewhere that such a pedigree-based approach does not need to be
completely static. 109 Indeed, pedigree-based
approaches to
international law ought not necessarily be condemned to be static.
According to that argument, theories of sources-if grounded in the
social practice of law-applying authorities--can change and can be
changed. This is the so-called social thesis-borrowed from English
analytical jurisprudence"o-which provides dynamism for an
otherwise entirely static product-centered conception of law. In the
specific context of international law, such a conceptualization makes
it possible to argue that the social practices of law-applying
authorities have long ceased to reflect the practices that the ancestral
Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice was meant to reflect. This is why, according to this thesis,
approaching the sources of international lawmaking from the

106.
See, e.g., Georges Abi-Saab, Cours General De Droit InternationalPublic,
207 RECUEIL DES COURS 39 (1987); Martti Koskenniemi, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA 165
(2005) (discussing attempts to create a law that is simultaneously "normative and
concrete"); Oscar Schachter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation, 8 VA. J.
INT'L L. 300, 307-08 (1967-1968) (attempting to identify the "obligatory norm" concept
based, in part, on McDougal); C. WILFRED JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 410
(1958) ("The international lawyer should know something of the basic features of the
historical and current foreign policies of the leading Powers and of the main groups of
states in all parts of the world and of the long-term trends which have characterised
their development; without such knowledge, his legal thinking will be apt to become an
abstraction remote from political realty and powerless to influence practical affairs.");
G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (1985) ("Where
Positivism does not go far enough in taking account of what is happening in society and
therefore is too rigid, the Policy Oriented approach goes too far and ends up almost
equating international law with the entire world social and political process.");
d'Aspremont, Non-State Actors in InternationalLaw: Oscillating Between Concepts and
Dynamics, supra note 17, at 3.
107.
See HIGGINS, supra note 88, at 8 (questioning whether these authors have
attempted to float a conciliatory understanding of international law).
108.
D'ASPREMONT, FORMALISM, supra note 11, at ch. 8 (highlighting the
ambition of FORMALISM AND THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw).
109.
Id.
110.
Jean d'Aspremont, Herbert Hart in Post-Modern International Legal
Scholarship, in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL POSITIVISM IN A POST-MODERN WORLD (J.
d'Aspremont & Jorg Kammerhofer eds., forthcoming 2013) (noting that "Hart's social
fact-based positivism did not seek to offer a general theory of the law").
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standpoint of Article 38 no longer makes much sense because it does
not reflect the current fledgling consensus among its main important
law-applying authorities. Instead, such a theory of sources ought to
radically depart from the static pedigree-determining blueprints
found in the mainstream literature and be shaped as a dynamic
model of rule ascertainment grounded in an ever-evolving social
practice. On top of advocating a move away from Article 38-and
especially the abandonment of the law-ascertaining role of state
intent for the identification of treaties or associated doctrines, like
those conveying illusions of formalism in the delimitation of
customary international law-this Article calls for a more pluralistic
conception of law-applying authorities that ought not to be restricted
to domestic and international courts and tribunals. New actors have
come to produce social practice determinative of the ascertainment
indicators contained in the theory of sources of international law.'
The virtues of such a dynamic pedigree-based approach also rest in
the abstract possibility to apprehend the international normative
activity, which nowadays takes place outside the ambit of traditional
international law and a strictly static approach would fall short of
capturing. Indeed, if the social practices that give rise to the criterion
of apprehension allow their capture as lawmaking, nothing precludes
their elevation into lawmaking.112
IV. EPISTEMIC PLURALISM AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL SELF-INTEREST
Making sense of international lawmaking has long been an
ambition of international legal scholars.113 In that endeavor, they
have been resorting to a wide variety of cognitive tools: subject,
pedigree, participant and actor, public authority, or a blend of several
of them. Each of these approaches has generated a different picture of
international lawmaking. According to the approach chosen,
international lawmaking appears as a more or less formal,
systematized, inclusive, and state-centric process.

111.
See, e.g., d'Aspremont, Non-State Actors From the Perspective of Legal
Positivism, supra note 8, at 25-30 (discussing the roles of legal scholars and
international courts and tribunals in producing these social practices).
112.
I have simultaneously challenged the urge of international lawyers to
apprehend these normative phenomena through their own cognitive instruments with
a view to necessarily including them in their scope of expertise and elevating them in
legal materials. I have called for some critical self-reflection of the gluttony of
international lawyers who systematically-and almost obsessively-seek to label every
phenomenon as law. Id.
113.
See generally Jorg Kammerhofer, Law-making by Scholars, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY AND

PRACTICES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING

1-2

(Catherine Brolmann & Yannick Radi eds., forthcoming 2013) (demonstrating a critical
stock taking of scholarly attempts to make sense of international lawmaking).
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It is undoubtedly not the aim of these concluding remarks to
vindicate one of these cognitive choices. There is probably not one
cognitive choice trumping the others. They all constitute a paradigm
that has its own merits. Coming to terms with the variety of
paradigms found in the literature pertaining to international
lawmaking should certainly not be construed as a call for radical
pluralism. In this author's view, merely accepting the plurality of
cognitive choices-and the conceptualizations of lawmaking inherent
in each of them-would boil down to nothing more than skeptical
relativism. Yet, it seems of import that when one grapples with issues
of lawmaking, then that one consciously assumes one's cognitive
choices. Assuming such choices, however, presupposes awareness, not
only of the underlying cognitive choice behind any study of
international lawmaking but also of the parameters informing it.
Indeed, cognitive choices, like those pertaining to the understanding
of international lawmaking, are not neutral.114 They are informed by
an array of different parameters. When it comes to foundational
topics like international lawmaking, one of these parameters is
certainly the observer's concept of law. The concept of law of the
observer will to a large degree-at least assuming cognitive and
methodological consistency-determine the cognitive tool to which
one resorts to make sense of international lawmaking. Another
parameter-probably very pregnant in choices determining
approaches to international lawmaking-rests in one's research
interest. In the author's view, it can hardly be denied that one
necessarily embraces an approach or a method that fits with the type
of research that one is interested in carrying out. The choice of one of
the cognitive tools mentioned above can also be read as an expression
for the preference of one given dimension of international lawmaking
for a given dimension of international law. For instance, those solely
interested in the formal sources of international law might favor a
pedigree-based approach to international lawmaking, which will lead
them to focus on a very narrow dimension of that process. Because of
their extremely narrow cognitive scope, pedigree-based approaches to
international lawmaking could even be seen as the manifestation of a
general lack of interest for the processes in international lawmaking.
On the contrary, participant- and actor-based understandings of
international lawmaking reflect the observer's interest in normgenerating processes rather than formal sources and the
identification of subjects.

114.
See Mark Greenberg, How Facts Make Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 157, 186
(2004), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=797125 (explaining that law practices,
including facts about participants' beliefs, cannot determine their own relevance).
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It is argued that awareness of such epistemological self-interest
allows greater mutual coexistence between the various approaches to
international lawmaking that have been outlined in this Article. But
awareness of the influence of epistemological self-interest in cognitive
choices in the studies of international lawmaking also calls for some
relativism. Epistemological interest in one dimension of international
lawmaking and, thus, the cognitive choices that they inform,
necessarily reflects a given epoch-the epoch in which the observers
situate themselves. The various cognitive choices behind studies of
international lawmaking inevitably have an epochal dimension. Such
an epochal anchorage of scholarly approaches to international
lawmaking is what ineluctably condemns the scholarship on
international lawmaking to a Sisyphean cognitive repetition.
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(H) Copies Not Distributed
(I) Total (Sum of (g) and h))

Average No. Copies
Each Issue During
Preceding
12 Months

No. Copies of Single
Issue Published
Nearest to Filing
Date

533
386
0
0

465
351
0
0

0
386

0
351

28

19

0

0

28
414
119
533

19
370
95
465

I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.
Is/ Linda Faye Johnson
Linda Faye Johnson
Program Coordinator

